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Introduction
This chapter compares the effects of parliamentary and separation of power 
systems on two dimensions of governmental capability—stability and interest 
representation—as they apply to the announced and operational strategic 
nuclear policies of the United States, Britain, and France The discussion is 
divided into three parts The introduction defines the scope of the discussion 
and key concepts It also briefly sketches the two major contending doctrinal 
schools of thought concermng nuclear deterrence This debate has framed 
much of the public discussion of nuclear policy, especially in the United 
States The purpose of this review is also to underline the point that 
uncertainty pervades nuclear threat, control, and use strategies The 
significance of uncertainty is that decisions affecting these dimensions of 
nuclear policy require political intervention to resolve The inherently 
political character of nuclear policy—who authoritatively decides nuclear 
policy and on what terms—squarely joins the issue raised by this volume, 
viz, the influence of a state s policy process and institutions on nuclear 
policy The second and third sections of the paper focus specifically on the 
capabilities of stability and representation
Scope of the Discussion
Announced policies refer to the public strategies advanced by 
Washington, London, and Pans to rationalize their acquisition of nuclear 
weapons They specifically cover the strategies of threat, use and control of 
nuclear weapons to achieve defined strategic and political aims, including 
what are deemed appropnate responses to domestic and foreign pressures 
Threats concern each state’s reliance on nuclear weapons to influence an 
opponent s behavior m desirable ways for strategic and political purposes 1 
Since World War n, nuclear threats have largely revolved around the 
creation of national deterrent postures that promise to visit intolerable 
destruction on Moscow, far m excess of the expected gam from aggression 
They also extend to a state's threat to use nuclear weapons for purposes of 
coercive diplomacy to get its way 2 Arms control strategies, on the other 
hand, refer primarily to the exploitation by adversaries of their shared, if 
implicit, interest in avoiding a mutually destructive nuclear exchange and m 
managing the costs and risks of a nuclear arms race 3
Use or operational strategies encompass the military plans actually 
designed by a state to deliver nuclear weapons on specified targets if 
deterrence fails and to fight a nuclear war They also cover the development, 
acquisition, and deployment of nuclear weapons systems, the targets assigned 
to them, and the C3I systems associated with these weapons (command, 
control, communications, and, intelligence) Operational strategies focus on
2what a government actually does or is likely to do under varying 
contingencies Defining a state s operational policies is not always easy A 
government may have less control of its behavior than it believes as one 
segment of the government acts contrary to the behavior of another Inter­
service rivalry or conflicting signals issuing from different policy units within 
a state—alternately threatening to use nuclear weapons and to negotiate arms 
control and disarmament accords—illustrate the point4 Fixing accurately a 
state s nuclear operational or use strategies is also hampered by the conditions 
of secrecy, innovation, orgamzational complexity, and uncertainty—central 
parameters of nuclear policymaking as a key component of national security
As for the weapons themselves, the discussion is principally concerned 
with those strategic nuclear systems of the Western nuclear states aimed at 
the nuclear capabilities, military bases, population and leadership centers, and 
logistical support structures of the Soviet Union For the United States these 
systems comprise a triad of nuclear forces, including B-52 and B-l bombers 
(with B-2 bombers scheduled for production), Minuteman and MX ground- 
based intercontinental missiles (ICBMs), and sea-launched intercontinental 
missiles based on Poseidon and Tndent submarines (SLBMs) Most ICBMs 
(Minuteman Es excepted) and SLBMs carry multiple independently targeted 
re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) As of June 1990, these approximately 2000 delivery 
systems, if maximally loaded, supported almost 12,500 warheads 5
Britain s nuclear forces are currently undergoing major 
modernization By the end of the decade, the Polaris fleet will be replaced 
with four British-built US Trident submarines Each submarine will be 
equipped with 16 D-5 missiles If Britain follows expected US practice once a 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) treaty is signed, each missile would 
be loaded with eight warheads 6 By the end of the century, France will also 
rely primarily on its submarine nuclear force for deterrence as its small 
Mirage IV and Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile forces become obsolete or 
are downgraded Each SLBM is scheduled to carry six MIRVed missiles
Uncertainty about What Makes Deterrence Work
One of the most important impediments to effective and efficient 
nuclear policymaking is simply the absence of a reliable theory to explain how 
nuclear deterrence works or, more generally, how threatening a state with 
nuclear weapons actually influences its behavior m favorable ways, if at a ll7 
The lack of empirically verifiable deterrence theory means that there are few 
dependable normative entena to guide military strategic thinking or to define 
precisely those capabilities which would best balance the competing 
requirements of threat, use, and control to achieve the political objectives that 
nuclear arms purportedly serve Like the man waving elephants away m 
Times Square, there is no way to disprove that his method does not work,
3however mindless his machinations may appear Since we have not had a 
nuclear war, it is not clear what has actually prevented its eruption The 
Western nuclear states may have been acquiring nuclear arms to prevent a 
Soviet attack that was never contemplated Or, if contemplated, they may 
well have been building inventories that had little or no relation to those 
factors that might have induced Soviet constraint, and, indeed, as some 
contend, their efforts may have unwittingly raised the risk of a nuclear 
confrontation through a costly arms race 8
At the risk of simplification, two schools of deterrence theory can be 
identified as having developed m the United States since the late 1950s to 
rationalize nuclear strategy and to define the military requirements of 
developing and procuring nuclear arms 9 These two schools have largely 
defined the outer limits of the public discussion, particularly m the United 
States, and the terms of reference of what would be considered acceptable 
among security and arms control elites m their debates and bargaining The 
strategic debate itself has not defined specific weapons nor is it a reliable guide 
as the sole factor explaining the US nuclear inventory As this analysis 
suggests, other factors than strategic theory, including domestic politics and 
the policy process, have critically influenced the composition of the US 
nuclear arsenal While the position of any one individual may overlap both 
doctrinal schools, several characteristics generally distinguish the approach of 
one group of strategic thinkers from another10
The first school views nuclear weapons as an extension of 
conventional armaments While partisans concede that nuclear weapons 
have introduced fundamental changes into how one must think and plan for 
war, they argue that the mere existence of these weapons is sufficient either to 
deter an adversary armed with nuclear weapons or to win or prevail in a war 
if deterrence, for whatever reason, should break down From this 
perspective, the immediate aim of a warflghtmg strategy is to limit damage to 
one s homeland and to one's vital interests, including those of allies, from 
the enemy s nuclear forces This criterion generates, therefore, offensive and 
defensive nuclear requirements, defmed as weapons capabilities, sufficient to 
destroy an adversary's nuclear forces as soon as a war is launched or 
threatened Sufficient residual capabilities are also identified to maintain 
mterwar deterrence, holding hostage the opponent s remaining capabilities 
and vital assets, m order to control escalation and to bargain for a speedy end 
to fighting on terms favorable to the nation and to its allies
Advocates maintain that, unless a credible nuclear warflghtmg posture 
is achieved, deterrence cannot be sustained An opponent will not be 
convinced that one has the capabilities to survive a first-strike, the will to 
prevail m an nuclear exchange or, if challenged with nonnuclear forces, to 
launch a ftrst-stnke Nuclear weakness supposedly breeds self-deterrence 
The early Kennedy administration and the first Reagan administration
4shared, not entirely for the same reasons, an announced attachment to a 
warfighting or counterforce strategy although neither achieved nor, arguably, 
ever really sought to attain, overwhelming nuclear superiority—or what 
might be termed an indisputable first-strike posture11
Critics who form the second school of thought are skeptical either that 
a nuclear war can be kept limited to so-called military targets or that 
escalation can be controlled12 Despite advances m guidance and warhead 
miniaturization, accuracy cannot be guaranteed in distinguishing between 
military and civilian targets Nor has the Soviet Union or the United States 
based their nuclear forces sufficiently far from population centers that a 
nuclear exchange would spare the latter either from the prompt explosive 
and fire effects of these weapons or from longer-term radiation Moreover, 
one should not expect in the fog of nuclear war that decisionmakers will act 
prudently or be able to limit nuclear exchanges even if they so wished, if 
command, control, and communications networks are destroyed or if a 
nation s leadership corps perishes in the first wave of a nuclear strike
Smce no way has been found to destroy all Soviet nuclear forces in a 
first-strike, advocates of this second school of thought insist on a condition of 
mutual assured destruction (MAD) between the superpowers Futile efforts 
to transform this condition m a search for a winning warñghtmg capability is 
said to sustain a costly and nsky arms race that, ironically, contributes to the 
defeat of deterrence that the pursuit of superiority is calculated to prevent13 
For some analysts, even a small number of nuclear weapons provide 
existential deterrence and only a relatively small but invulnerable arsenal 
needs to be maintained14
I
There currently exists no generally accepted body of theory or practice 
that can be invoked to choose definitively between these two doctrinal 
positions Other factors, including the constraints and opportunities afforded 
by the political system of a nation, shape its nuclear choices of weapons and 
strategy How the political system of the United States, Britain, and France 
have influenced their nuclear policies, particularly with in regard to their 
capabilities for stability and interest representation, is addressed in the next 
section
Policy Stability
The Stability of US Nuclear Policies
The operational nuclear strategic policies of the United States, Britain, 
and France evidence considerable stability since the early 1960s As noted 
earlier, operational nudear policies apply to those acquisition and 
deployment policies designed to prevent the defeat of deterrence and to those 
plans to use nudear weapons if deterrence breaks down While the
5modalities of these policies and plans have inevitably changed as new 
capabilities have entered US and allied inventories and as Soviet nuclear 
forces have also been upgraded and deployed, the United States, on the one 
hand, and Britain and France on the other, have not deviated fundamentally 
from their general strategic onentations set, by and large, in the early 1960s
Changes have primarily occurred in the announced nuclear policies of 
the Western nuclear states These pronouncements have had no discernible 
effect on the relative strategic postures of these states, however much they 
may have signalled shifts m their capabilities, modernization programs, or 
diplomatic bargaining positions This is not too surprising since announced 
policies as the discussion below illustrates, serve a wider range of strategic and 
political purposes and respond more sensitively than operational policies to 
domestic and allied pressures as well as to shifts in adversary behavior 
Operational policies also imply that nuclear weapons are in place or under 
development This hardware environment, while subject to constant 
innovation, changes more slowly than political and strategic conditions 
within which the nuclear competition between East and West has taken 
place
US operational plans are keyed to what may be termed a MAD+++ 
policy The MAD or Mutual Assured Destruction element of the formula— 
first defined by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara as the ability of the 
United States to destroy one-third of the population and three-quarters of the 
productive resources of the Soviet Union in a second strike15—refers to the 
commitment of the United States to deliver an unacceptable retaliatory blow 
against the Soviet Umon in the event of an attack against its own territory or 
vital interests Meeting the nuclear requirements of this extreme 
contingency, however, does not accurately reflect US operational policies 
These are more shaped by the warñghting entena, noted above, than by MAD, 
although even the most ardent partisans of nuclear warfightmg concede that 
the achievement of such a posture can only be approximated, and not fully 
assured Quite aside from allied and domestic political stnetures that have 
inhibited an unconditional embrace of warfightmg, countervailing Soviet 
capabilities have essentially frustrated efforts to achieve US nuclear 
ascendancy In a word, neither side can today disarm the nuclear capabilities 
of its opponent m a flrst-stnke
The pluses in the MAD formula, sigmfy the actual targets and 
targeting plans devised by the US to execute its nuclear policies These are 
incorporated and constantly updated m the Single Integrated Operational 
Plan (SIOP) of the Umted States As one prominent student of US targeting 
observes, "The SIOP contains a target list with data on all targets for the 
assignment of all US strategic weapons systems to various targets, and a wide 
variety of options for the actual employment of these weapons against 
designated targets ’16 Since the abandonment of Massive Retaliation and US
6targeting plans to deliver an all-out nuclear knockout punch against the 
Soviet Union m the early 1960s,17 US long-range nuclear warheads are 
principally aimed at the corresponding nuclear capabilities of the Soviet 
Union i e , at its military installations, logistical and transport centers, and at 
all assets that support its ability to wage war Damage limitation, escalation 
control and dominance, quick termination of hostilities, and bargaimng 
leverage are the principal criteria relied upon to rationalize and generate 
nuclear requirements These are considerably larger than the number of 
weapons that would be needed simply to meet McNamara s MAD formula18 
In addition, the US has consistently refused to abandon the option that it 
might use nuclear weapons first in the face of Soviet aggression, even against 
a conventional attack Efforts in the early 1980s by several prominent 
members of the US security community failed to overturn this commitment, 
and it remains as part of official policy19
Several important factors, quite apart from the US policy process, 
which is the concern of this chapter, provide a partial explanation for US 
nuclear forces and for an SIOP defined by a MAD-plus posture US 
perceptions of the Soviet nuclear threat are critical The gradual emergence of 
superpower nuclear parity and the continued build up and modernization of 
Soviet nuclear capabilities, especially the programs pursued by Moscow 
through most of the 1970s, furnished a powerful impetus to the expansion of 
US nuclear forces It appeared to many in the United States that the Soviet 
Union was bent on gaming a position of nuclear superiority and in 
implementing its own warfighting strategy 20
Second, it is useful to make the obvious, but critical, point that, unlike 
its nuclear allies, the Umted States had the economic and techno-scientific 
means at its disposal to opt, if it chose, either for a warfighting, or a MAD- 
plus, or simply a MAD posture Motive and means—the perception of a 
heightened Soviet military threat, a global struggle with a committed 
ideological opponent, and ample economic and techno-saentific resources to 
respond to these challenges—conditioned the choice to pursue a MAD-plus 
stance since the late 1960s
Conversely, the mere existence—even expansion—of Soviet nuclear 
capabilities and growing concern m policy areles and m public opmion of the 
strategic implications of these developments did not themselves prescribe or 
dictate US nuclear responses One would have to examine US global political 
and strategic aims, including what were assumed by policymakers to be 
alliance obligations, as well as widely held views about the requirements of 
deterrence and the alleged bargaimng leverage afforded by nuclear weapons, 
to fully explain U S nuclear weapons and the doctrinal position adopted by 
US strategists and policymakers A discussion of these international aims and 
doctrinal choices, as factors shapmg US nuclear capabilities and poliaes, falls 
largely outside the scope of this discussion although their sahency is difficult
7to exaggerate What is important for the purposes of this volume is to 
identify what appears to be the contribution made by U S institutions and 
decisional processes to the observed stability of US nuclear policies
The diffusion and decentralized structure of US nuclear 
decisionmaking institutions and processes, sustained by the separation of 
powers between Congress and the President, partly, but significantly, explain 
US operational nuclear strategic policy and targeting practices Multiple access 
points exist within the policy process for the partisans of defensive and 
offensive nuclear systems to press their cases and to achieve at least some of 
their strategic aims whether for a warfighting or for an expanded MAD 
posture Opportunities are also created for those with a narrow interest 
simply m developing a particular weapon system or component of the US 
nuclear arsenal These interests cover a wide range of activities, including 
efforts to launch a new weapon system, perfect those already deployed or 
under development, or to increase their number
Proponents of nuclear weapons systems or partisans of a broad and 
varied nuclear posture—signified by the notion of a nuclear tnad of sea- 
and ground-based intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range 
bombers—are not limited to the military services, charged to develop the 
nation s defense forces, or simply to weapons contractors which have an 
interest in their development They extend beyond the military-industrial 
complex (MIC) or what others have termed the iron-triangle, composed of 
military, industrial and Congressional interests purportedly dedicated to 
weapons development and production 21 In the two major bmld ups of the 
postwar period—in the early Kennedy and Reagan years—the President, in 
cooperation with Congressional leaders and with appointed civilian officials, 
most prominently the Secretaries of Defense, led the nuclear expansion 
programs, well in excess of the nuclear requirements then officially defined by 
the military services in their official spending requests In the context of what 
appeared to be a dear, present, and expanding Soviet danger, m the late 1950s 
and again m the late 1970s, the very diffusion of power centers between and 
within the two branches facilitated the promotion and maintenance of a 
multiple nuclear system, which crystallized m a sustained commitment to a 
nudear tnad of bombers, ICBMs, and SLBMs
The diffusion of power within the US system is not confined to 
Congress and the President or to the proliferation of committees concerned 
with nudear policy and weapon systems within House and Senate It also 
characterizes Executive branch decision-makmg The policy process within 
the Executive branch resembles what Samuel P Huntington, J r , was among 
the first to characterize as a legislative process 22 Its elements include the 
agencies officially represented in the National Security Council, most 
prominently the Secretaries of State, Defense, and the Head of the Central 
Intelligence Agency, and extends to the units within these agencies
8Presidents have exercised varying degrees of control over this agency 
sprawl The success of each President and his use of the National Security 
Council (NSC), specifically legislated to coordinate the principal departments 
and umts concerned with security affairs, has fluctuated with the interest and 
ability of presidents to use this organizational tool Also important m 
explaining success or failure are the Presidents political power and will and 
the resources of the established bureaucracies—in league with each other, 
allies m Congress, and outside supporters—to resist presidential discipline 23
Not unlike presidents, Secretaries of Defense have varied widely in 
their interest and ability to set nuclear procurement requirements for the 
services and to define operational policy 24 They can command the services 
to do their bidding on a few important issues, especially if they enjoy backing 
from a politically strong President Otherwise, they have to bargain with the 
services and even with their own civilian secretaries within the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD) By most accounts, Robert McNamara, the most 
energetic and ambitious of postwar Secretaries of Defense, had mixed success 
m imposing his preferences on the military services In announcing his 
commitment to a counterforce strategy in the early years of his tenure, he 
primed the military services to rapidly enlarge their force requirement 
requests to implement the new strategy 23 In response to his own policy 
guidelines, the Air Force exceeded, by more than double, his expected 
requests, forcing the Defense Secretary to limit Air Force requests to 1000 
Mmuteman missiles In the resulting bargaining between OSD and the Air 
Force, McNamara reportedly added 50 Minutemen to his approved ceiling as 
partial compensation for his cancellation of the Air Force s Skybolt program 2^  
On another occasion, he relented m authorizing an additional nuclear carrier 
for the Navy that he was disposed to reject One can slay only so many 
dragons each day, he explained 27
The tendency of the US process to initiate nuclear programs and then 
resist terminating them is also suggested by the experience with the B-l 
bomber and the MX missile At least two Presidents—Kennedy and Carter— 
attempted to end follow-on bomber programs to the B-52 These efforts were 
frustrated by the Air Force m cooperation with allies m Congress and in the 
aerospace industry First, President Kennedy was forced to relent to 
Congressional demands, focused m the Armed Services Committee, that 
funds for the then RS-70 program, which had been impounded, be released 
Later, m a related episode, President Carter actually terminated the B-l 
program as redundant m light of the secret development of the Stealth 
bomber (B-2) and the modernization of the other components of the US triad 
The B-l survived anyway under different research and development rubrics 
until it could again be rehabilitated in the expansion years of the Reagan 
administration 28
9The long and frustrating search for a workable ground-based missile 
system that would solve the problem of vulnerability to a surprise Soviet 
attack also illustrates, even more pointedly than the B-l case, how the US 
political process has favored weapons initiatives and discouraged the 
termination of programs once they have begun Support can be generated 
throughout the system The initial approach to the search for a ground-based 
strategic missile to meet incipient MAD-plus requirements and also solve the 
problem of vulnerability to a Soviet first-strike attack was the MX missile 
The MX can react quickly to an impending attack and has hard-target 
capability to destroy enemy missile sites 29 Well over 30 basing modes for the 
MX were considered Both the Carter and Reagan administrations proposed 
several iterations of how such a system might be constructed, including a 
mobile system with 200 missiles and 2000 warheads, a Dense Pack with 100 
missiles and 1000 warheads, and, finally, the replacement of 100 Minuteman 
systems with 100 MX missiles Alternatives to the MX, like a fleet of B-52 
bombers armed with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) and short-range 
attack missiles (SRAMS) as well as a new mobile Midgetman missile were 
also proposed Whereas the Air Force, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the 
Pentagon preferred MX, the Midgetman enjoyed considerable support in 
Congress, where partisans were attracted by its mobility and smgle-warhead 
design
Since strategic doctrine cannot definitively define the requirements of 
nuclear deterrence, capabilities are appreciably shaped by a senes of rolling 
compromises among players in the sprawling Amencan secunty policy 
community as a function of their domestic bargaining power and interests, 
and not solely as an objective response to a perceived Soviet threat (whose 
status in bureaucratic infighting within the Pentagon was rarely 
unambiguous ) The special blue-nbbon commission impanelled by President 
Reagan to compromise differences between Congress and the Executive 
branch advised spending for MX and Midgetman, but at levels that were too 
low to meet the damage limitation requirements of those pressing for a thick 
MAD-plus strategy (with the MX as their champion), but too high to satisfy 
advocates of a thin MAD-plus stance (A simple MAD posture effectively had 
no constituency within the secunty policy process ) A thm MAD-plus strategy 
was to be advanced by Midgetman, a mobile smgle-warhead system 
Midgetman was viewed as more stable (ì e , less vulnerable than fixed-site 
systems) and, smce it was purportedly not to be MIRVed, more disposed to 
foster progress in arms control accords with the Soviet Union After over a 
decade of struggle the controversy was still not over as the Bush 
administration assumed office in 1989 30 Only 50 MX missiles (with 500 hard- 
kill warheads) were authorized by Congress Meanwhile, Congress 
appropriated funds for Midgetmen over the objections of the Air Force and 
the Pentagon which preferred to put the MX on rail cars to decrease its 
vulnerability B-52s were also armed with ALCMs, the Trident submanne
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program was affirmed, and funds for 15 B-2s were authorized with an 
additional 60 requested by the Pentagon
It may well be that a more centralized, parliamentary system of 
government might have pursued the same policies and created the same 
nuclear capabilities If it cannot be definitively shown that political pluralism 
promotes nuclear proliferation, it can at least be argued that the 
decentralization and diffusion of the US, did not block or appreciably impede 
the development of US nuclear capabilities The American policy process 
also did not preclude sustained support throughout the security policy 
community and the larger public for a triad of nuclear capabilities—and a 
thick triad at that, since each leg is expected to meet the minimal test of 
simple MAD Rather than choose among potentially competing nuclear 
proposals, the policy process chose them all MX, Midgetman, and B-52s with 
ALCMs and SRAMs were all produced along with the B-l and B-2 bombers 
and the Navy s submarine nuclear missile fleet, not to mention its aircraft 
carrier nuclear capabilities Even the Army was authorized in the 1970s to 
develop the Pershing n, which was capable of hitting targets in Eastern 
Europe and western Russia If strategic nuclear systems are defined by the 
targets destroyed, then the Army, until the signature of the Intermediate- 
Range and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, was as much an arm 
of US strategic might as the Air Force and Navy
The decentralization of US power centers biases decisions on weapons 
systems in at least two significant ways First, it provides multiple sources for 
weapons proposals and, similarly, multiple access points to intervene in 
support of a program Under conditions of an enlarging external threat and 
the availability of potentially mobilizable resources to meet that threat (not to 
mention pressures to create military forces to underwrite an ambitious 
foreign policy), the diffuse centers of decision of the US system fostered new 
proposals and provided political and financial assistance to keep them alive 
These initiatives arose from many sources, including ground swells of public 
opimon felt throughout the policy process Congress, too, quite apart from 
military service prompting and at times over presidential resistance, has at 
times assumed the lead m expanding military spending and nuclear 
programs The Kennedy expansion of the 1960s, for example, was presaged m 
repeated Congressional efforts at the end of the 1950s to increase defense 
spending for ICBMs, SLBMS, and bombers over the objections of the 
Eisenhower administration 31
Second, the decentralization of the US systems also has what might be 
termed a ratchet effect, once nuclear systems are m place or set m motion 
along the path toward development and production Sunk costs, ample 
service budgetary reserves of unobligated funds to tide over a program m lean 
years, implicit service compromises (the Navy with Trident had little 
incentive to challenge the Air Force's MX or B-l),32 lucrative weapons
11
contracts, and Congressional constituency interests—all of these factors, each 
with its own political base, conspire over time to protect nuclear programs of 
interest to weapons proponents from cancellation or reduction 33 Ongoing 
programs create incentives for elected officials, including presidential 
candidates, seeking votes by supporting a particular weapon system or a 
strategic position associated with increased spending on nuclear systems 
President Nixon, for example, is reported to have shaped his campaign 
strategy m California by promoting the expectation that his election would 
ensure development of the B-l bomber and the continued flow of aerospace 
contracts to the state 34
More generally, the US long-term commitment to a nuclear triad and 
to multiple weapon systems has essentially bureaucratized nuclear weapons 
within the American policy process These nuclear institutions have allies 
throughout the defense policymaking process among the military services 
and intelligence community, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other 
Executive agencies as well as m Congress, the arms industry, and techno- 
saentific centers, particularly the nuclear weapons laboratories and think 
tanks associated with defense The conditions of secrecy and techno-scientific 
and military expertise, associated with nuclear weapons, furnish privileged 
access of policymakers within the nuclear weapons establishment to promote 
their interests in maintaining the nuclear capabilities at their disposal and in 
modernizing their arsenals These focused and determined interests, as 
studies of US weapons procurement evidence,35 can effectively resist efforts to 
weaken their hold on nuclear policies and plans while their privileged access 
to the policy process enhances their self-mterested claims
Those favoring a MAD-plus operational strategy may well argue that 
the separation of powers system has produced more coherent and consistent 
nuclear policies than one might expect from so decentralized and diffuse a 
process Partisans of MAD or of mimmal nuclear capabilities have reason to 
be less persuaded by the purported rationality of the political and policy 
process and its ability to meet the nation's nuclear needs Whatever one s 
strategic preferences might be, one would still have to give the US political 
system high marks for stability 36
The Stability of French and British Nuclear Policies
The same may be said of Britain and France under the Fifth Republic 
The limited resources available to each state dictated the construction of 
much smaller, but still formidable, nuclear forces than the superpowers 
While these matenal limits could not be overcome without considerable cost 
to other strategic and non-strategic programs, it is still arguable whether the 
decisions to develop nuclear weapons in the first place or to stay m the 
nuclear arms race, once engaged, were inevitable It is from the perspective of 
these two choices that the two systems have demonstrated considerable policy
12
stability in pursuit of what might be termed a strategy of proportional 
deterrence Each strove to develop an invulnerable nuclear capability 
sufficient to destroy Soviet material and human resources m substantial 
excess to any expected gam that Moscow might have sought in attacking 
British or French vital interests Unlike the United States, neither London 
nor Paris sought to match the size or sophistication of the Soviet arsenal
The French case is particularly interesting Two different regimes—the 
Fourth and Fifth Republics—had to address the same set of nuclear policy 
issues France provides a controlled experiment to test policy outcomes as a 
function of institutional change Styled on traditional parliamentary lines, 
the Fourth Republic was headed by a Prime Minister, whose cabinet was 
responsible to a majority of the National Assembly Through its brief life, the 
Fourth Republic was essentially ruled by constantly shifting party coalitions 
While the governments of the Fourth Republic proved unstable, as they 
repeatedly lost the confidence of the legislature, cabinet portfolios tended to be 
circulated among a small group of party leaders who reappeared m successive 
cabinet shuffles This partially counterbalancing element of stability within 
Fourth Republic governments permitted a select number of cabinet officials, 
favoring a nuclear weapons program, to occupy, at key penods during the 
1950s, positions of influence to facilitate the covert development of France's 
military nuclear program
No Fourth Republic government was openly able to avow a nuclear 
weapons program In its formative years, the French nuclear program was 
secretly pursued by a small but determined clique of nuclear scientists, 
military officers, and civilian bureaucrats without the full knowledge, much 
less the approval, of the National Assembly or even of most cabinet members 
of the governments that were formed Only in the dosing months of the 
Fourth Republic in 1958 did Pnme Minister Felix Gaillard officially authorize 
the test of a nuclear device although the government and the parliament— 
indeed the regime itself—did not survive long enough to approve his 
decision 37
Charles de Gaulle, first President of the Fifth Republic and its principal 
constitutional architect, charged that the Fourth Republic failed to cope with 
threats to national security or to advance French interests abroad 38 According 
to de Gaulle, the incentives of party rule, lodged m the office of the Pnme 
Mimster as head of a coalition government, blurred national security and 
foreign policy choices and weakened its bargaining position abroad The 
interests of party and partisan advantage implicitly assumed precedence over 
national interests There was no assurance that winning, but weakly ruling, 
coalitions would—or could—pursue consistent and effective foreign and 
security policies The imperatives of domestic politics (low politics) were, 
according to de Gaulle, subordinated to the imperatives of responding to 
external threats Opportunities to increase France's power and influence—its
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grandeur (high politics)—were also ignored or wasted Under a 
parliamentary, party-dominated system, de Gaulle alleged, no one person was 
ever fully in charge of the nation s defense These functions tended to get lost 
and slighted—even undermined—in the bargains reached by cabinet 
members of different parties whose support for the government was needed 
to maintain parliamentary confidence 39
De Gaulle s solution was to separate the president s office from the 
parliament and to base the office on universal and popular election The 
President s authority would be derived directly from the people 40 The Fifth 
Republic identifies the president as le garant (garantor) of the state In an 
emergency, the President has special powers to discharge this responsibility 
without the consent, or a vote of confidence, of the National Assembly In 
normal times, day-to-day governance is left to a Prime Mimster, chosen by the 
President, and to the cabinet which is formed by the President s appointee 
This government is responsible to the National Assembly, much like the 
British Prime Minister and her cabinet are answerable to Parliament
De Gaulle directly linked his presidency and the institutions of the 
Fifth Republic to the adoption of an independent nuclear deterrent No 
clearer joining between a nation s nuclear policy and its policy process and 
governmental institutions appears in the postwar experience of the three 
Western nuclear states Dunng the early years of the Fifth Republic, the De 
Gaulle government deliberately ran the risk of defeat in the National 
Assembly in pushing through the force de frappe over strong opposition to 
the program Since the 1960s, French nuclear capabilities have been 
developed through a series of five-year law programs, leadmg successively to 
the creation of a Mirage IV bomber force, 18 Intermediate-Range Ballistic 
Missiles (IRBMs), and six nuclear submarines De Gaulle s risky gambit 
worked Support for an independent nuclear deterrent now cuts across all 
political parties and is rooted deeply in French public opimon
Would France have had nuclear forces if the Fourth Republic had 
survived7 It is difficult to answer this question conclusively Despite the 
absence of governmental and legislative approval, the French steadily 
progressed toward developing a nuclear weapons capability under the Fourth 
Republic, including a nuclear explosives capacity and the initial development 
of the Mirage IV bomber However, neither the development of nuclear 
weapons nor of the Mirage IV, specifically for the purpose of a nuclear 
delivery system, were ever put to a legislative vote under the Fourth 
Republic Secrecy protected the first, and dissembling the second, agamst 
attack It is conceivable that sufficient support would have been marshalled 
to go ahead with a nuclear test and eventually to develop deliverable nuclear 
weapons Much time, patience, and delicate political bargaimng would have 
been required for even a determined prime minister under the Fourth 
Republic to piece together a reliable, long-term majority favoring a national
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nuclear capability Fifth Republic French Presidents, aided by controlling 
majorities in the National Assembly, were able to join the issue of nuclear 
weapons and of legislative-executive responsibility for the program and base 
the force de dissuasion on broad and public support, an option that was 
neither pursued nor readily available to Fourth Republic prime ministers 41
The British have been no less focused in developing nuclear weapons 
than the French under the Fifth Republic Since World War II successive 
British governments have consistently pursued two interdependent strategic 
aims British possession of nuclear weapons and close military and foreign 
policy association with the United States 42 For a little more than a decade 
after World War II, the two policies had to be pursued separately since the US 
McMahon Act prohibited military nuclear collaboration with any other state 
Although rebuffed by Washington, notwithstanding the important 
contribution made by Britain to the development of the atomic bomb m its 
early stages, the British government went ahead with its own national 
program These decisions led, in the 1950s, to the development of fission and 
fusion bombs and to the construction of a V-bomber force to deliver nuclear 
weapons agamst Soviet targets The latter were principally identified as 
population and industrial centers, with Moscow at the head of the list of sites 
to be destroyed 43 The success of these efforts finally prompted a revision of 
the McMahon act, enabling US-Bntish nuclear cooperation to recommence 
Since the 1950s, successive American governments m Washington and 
London have seen value m mutually influencing each other s nuclear 
policies through cooperation and m nurturing close ties across a broad range 
of shared strategic and foreign policy aims
Whereas the French sought to influence US nuclear policy through 
independence, British officials preferred to reach the same objective by 
multiplying and by strengthening the political and strategic relations between 
the two countries Nuclear cooperation was designed not only to gam access 
to US assistance and know-how but also to be one of the principal vehicles to 
ensure close policy collaboration This policy produced the Polans accord to 
share US nuclear submanne and missile technology with Bntain m the 1960s 
and 1970s and subsequently to the modernization of the Bntish fleet and 
nuclear forces with the adoption of the Tndent submarine system and D-5 
missile in the 1980s In exchange for US assistance, Bntain pledged its nuclear 
forces to NATO and to coordinate their targeting with that of the United 
States It retains the nght to withdraw these forces in times of extreme 
national emergency
Throughout the long postwar penod, Labor and Conservative 
governments have successfully weathered senous challenges to an 
mdependent Bntish nuclear weapons program and to close ties with the 
United States, particularly with respect to foreign affairs and nuclear weapons 
The first major challenge came from those who m the 1950s wished
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unilaterally to renounce the British nuclear weapon program Within 
partisan circles this attack was primarily mounted within the ranks of the 
Labor party In I960, the party convention adopted a resolution favoring 
umlateral nuclear disarmament Hugh Gaitskill, the Labor party leader who 
initially failed to defeat this plank, subsequently turned Labor opimon 
around By 1964 the Labor party, then headed by Harold Wilson, entered the 
elections reconciled to Polaris Once in power, Wilson affirmed the nuclear 
policies of his Conservative party predecessors, amending the accord with the 
United States only marginally by reducing the number of British Polaris 
submarines from five to four
Public and party opposition persisted throughout the 1970s and 1980s 
This did not prevent Wilson from secretly approving the Chevaline program 
The introduction of Soviet anti-ballistic missiles around Moscow raised 
doubts about the penetrability of British Polaris missiles, then armed with 
only one warhead To ensure the penetration of British warheads, the British 
undertook to develop a new warhead for its Polaris missiles that would both 
increase their number and offer greater chance for penetration, through 
concealment and decoys, of Soviet anti-ballistic missile defenses around 
Moscow Public revelation of Chevaline came only after the Labor party had 
left office m 1979 Outrage within Labor party ranks and reforms of internal 
party governance to preclude such secret decisions if Labor were to assume 
power had no effect on the Thatcher government s determination to 
complete Chevaline
The next major challenge to the British nuclear program and ipso facto, 
close policy coordination with Washington, was the Thatcher government s 
decision to build Tndent and to adopt the US s D-5 missile The Thatcher 
government was able to defeat the efforts of the Labor party and the Social- 
Democratic-Liberal party alliance to scrap Tndent Although the 
Conservative government never won more than 43 percent of the vote in the 
elections of 1983 and 1987, it was able to win a substantial majonty of the seats 
in Parliament given the Bntish system of single-member districts which 
awards a seat to whoever is first past the gate Declining electoral support for 
the Social Democrats after the 1987 elections and the gradual reconciliation of 
Labor s party leadership to Tndent, much like Polaris before, suggests that this 
latest assault on postwar Bntish nuclear policies and on US-British 
cooperation will also be frustrated
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Representing Interests
United States Practice
To the degree that there are senous differences over nuclear weapons 
and strategy, the representation of these differences, and the divergent 
interests that they imply, can potentially undermine the pursuit of stable 
nuclear policies Stability and representation need not be mutually exclusive 
Fifth Republic nuclear policies rest on a solid footing of elite and public 
support although the debate over announced strategy has often been vigorous 
among specialists and those close to nuclear policymaking 44 These debates 
have had no appreciable effect on the acquisition of France s nuclear 
inventory, nor have they ever challenged the Gaullist policy of a nationally 
autonomous force de dissuasion Stability and representation have been 
harmonized under the conditions of a govemmentally galvanized public and 
elite consensus that France s nuclear forces remain independent Elite and 
public harmony with governmental nuclear policies never characterized the 
Fourth Republic Nor has the evolution of US or British nuclear policies, 
especially since the 1950s,45 when the US-Soviet balance of terror first 
emerged, been marked by a consistent consensus on announced nuclear 
policies
The three Western systems have addressed the stability-representation 
dichotomy differently The US system has evidenced the greatest robustness 
in accommodating or, at least, in permitting different strategic points of view 
to be expressed m the policy process than the British system or the French 
decisional process under the Fifth Republic The critical importance of 
Congress, private associations, industrial and techno-scienüftc interests, and 
the media within the United States as well as the diffuse centers of power and 
influence within the US security policymaking process of the Executive 
branch, provide many avenues for the ventilation of criticism and dissent 
and for the partial recognition of interests at odds with official governmental 
policies The seeming paradox of the continuing pursuit of a MAD-plus 
posture, with the accompanying development and modernization of a 
nuclear inventory to support this posture, on the one hand, and of the 
adaptation of American nuclear policies to divergent strategic perspectives 
and interests, on the other, can be reconciled to a great extent by 
distinguishing between operational and announced policy
Announced policies necessarily address a wider number of interests 
and constituencies than operational policies Every American governmental 
pronouncement on nuclear weapons is received simultaneously by three 
audiences the Soviet Union as the principal opponent (and other 
adversaries), allies whose security mterests are directly affected by US policies, 
and domestic elites and the public on whose support an administration s 
policies Anally depend Threatened adversaries aside, the history of US
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nuclear policies indicates that it has been impossible to develop doctrinal 
statements, covering the threat, use, and control of nuclear weapons, and 
their corresponding procurement programs, that have simultaneously 
satisfied administration partisans as well as foreign allies and domestic critics
Announced nuclear strategy may thus be understood as the product of 
the political demands of allies and domestic elements and the equilibrium 
struck among these often contesting elements within the Executive branch 
about the requirements, alternately, of responding to adversary threats, of 
underwriting diplomatic bargaining with nuclear weapons, and of seizing on 
opportunities for cooperation on arms control accords with the Soviet Union 
Announced nuclear policies are sensitive to new or emerging pressures for 
change or to shifts in an administration s strategic priorities During periods 
of what were perceived to be an expanding Soviet threat, announced strategic 
doctrine has been recalibrated to emphasize a more threatemng US posture to 
respond to the growing nuclear power of the Soviet Union or to its military 
or political intervention abroad or to allied and domestic damonngs for a 
tougher US stand At times of superpower relaxation and détente, the arms 
control and disarmament aspects of nuclear policies have been stressed 
Similarly, when allies or domestic critics have been more disturbed than 
assured by administration pronouncements keyed to threatening the Soviet 
Union or to fighting a limited nuclear war, then announced policies have 
tended to be shaped with an eye toward quieting or isolating opponents
The adaptability of US nuclear strategic policies to these competing 
pressures can be illustrated by briefly reviewing the évolution of announced 
US strategic doctrine and of the conflicting functions served by arms control 
as a key component of nuclear strategy 46 Growing opposition to the Korean 
War and to US military intervention abroad and concern m business areles 
and the public with high defense spending prompted the adoption of a 
Massive Retaliation doctrine 47 Capitalizing on the passmg nuclear 
monopoly of the United States, the Eisenhower administration s Massive 
Retaliation strategy proposed to meet possible Soviet and Communist 
aggression by relymg more on nuclear weapons than on conventional arms 
Massive Retaliation promised to respond to Commumst threats around the 
globe at a lower cost m human and material resources to the United States 
than the limited war poliaes of the Truman administration The burden for 
defense was also shifted to allies European partners and most particularly 
West Germany were expected to provide the bulk of nonnuclear forces for 
their defense
The end of the US nuclear monopoly, dramatized by the Sputnik 
launch of October 1957, as well as Communist expansion into the developing 
world and slowing economic growth m the late 1950s, aided the election of 
the Kennedy administration m 1960 The strategic review undertaken by 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara resulted in the abandonment of
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Massive Retaliation and its replacement by Flexible Response The latter 
generated increased military requirements for nuclear and nonnuclear forces 
and for a substantial increase m defense expenditures Not only the doctrine 
but the term itself, Flexible Response, has proven to be highly malleable 
and adapted to changing external strategic and internal and alliance political 
needs for successive Washington administrations of different partisan 
colorations
The conceptual ambiguity inherent in Flexible Response and, 
accordingly, its political utility m signalling a more or less threatening 
nuclear posture depending on circumstances, is suggested by the contradictory 
meanings attached to the term over the years by policymakers and analysts, 
ranging from a shorthand for warfighting, a code word for MAD, or for an 
enhanced emphasis on nonnuclear forces McNamara himself used Flexible 
Response successively to cover a counterforce or warfightmg posture and 
then MAD and MAD-plus 48 It also accommodated the signing of the Partial 
Test Ban (PTB) treaty in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis The PTB 
addressed domestic and international demands to eliminate the health 
hazards of above-ground testing, to slow the arms race, and to lower Cold 
War tensions, heightened by the expansion of strategic nuclear weapons by 
both superpowers No less was the term useful to redefine the nuclear debate 
between the Umted States and its NATO allies, first for the Umted States to 
oppose m the early 1960s, and then to accept at the NATO Ottawa meeting in 
1974, independent European nuclear forces as contributions to the Western 
deterrent Flexible Response also prepared, albeit with only mixed results, the 
expansion of US and European nonnuclear capabilities in the 1960s and 1970s 
to meet what were perceived as a growing number of Commumst threats to 
Western Europe and to Western interests in the developing world, threats 
which Washington argued could not plausibly be deterred by nuclear 
weapons
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, when opposition to US intervention 
m Vietnam grew and resistance to defense spending mounted, US nuclear 
policy under Presidents Johnson, Nixon, and Ford gradually shifted to arms 
control themes, emphasizing nuclear panty between the superpowers and 
agreements to limit defensive and offensive strategic weapons 
Vietnamization, withdrawal of US troops from Vietnam, and cuts in military 
programs and expenditures were accompanied by the signature in 1972 of 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) I, restncting the development and 
deployment of anti-ballistic missiles, and an interim accord on offensive 
weapons that eventually crystallized as the SALT II treaty The resumption of 
direct US contacts with Communist China was of a piece with the pnonty 
assigned to nuclear stability and the hope of real disarmament and a 
resumption of the politics of détente These efforts also resulted in the Berlin 
accords of 1971, essentially eliminating discord over the city from the Cold
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War struggle, and in the Helsinki accords of 1975, establishing the Conference 
on Security and Cooperation m Europe (CSCE)
Nuclear policies within the United States then hardened in the decade 
between the middle of the 1970s and 1980s Domestic and allied pressures 
mounted for a US response to what again appeared as a rising Soviet military 
and political threat around the globe These concerns centered on the 
deployment of heavy SS-18 missiles aimed at US ground-based systems—the 
so-called ’window of vulnerability —the development of SS-20 missiles 
targeted against NATO bases in Europe, and increased Soviet influence in the 
developing world, culminating in the Soviet military intervention m 
Afghanistan By the end of the Carter administration, military expenditures, 
including spending for new nuclear systems, were increased to levels that 
approached those of the early Reagan administration New targeting 
guidelines were also issued m Presidential Directive-59 Greater priority than 
before was assigned to military and civilian leadership sites and to fighting an 
extended nuclear war 49 Approval was also given in December 1979 to deploy 
Pershing II and cruise missiles in Europe to modernize NATO long-range 
nuclear forces Meanwhile, the SALT H treaty was withdrawn from Senate 
consideration in protest to Soviet aggression
The nuclear build up and the emphasis on warfightmg capabilities 
(MX, B-l, B-2, ALCMs, SRAMs, and Tndents D-5 missile) were aggressively 
pursued through the first Reagan administration Defense expenditures for 
nuclear and nonnuclear forces dimbed to $300 billion annually Washington 
rejected any moratorium on nuclear testing in line with the expansion of US 
nuclear forces The ceilings on nuclear deployments set by SALT II were 
exceeded The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was advanced m 1983 to 
strengthen US anti-ballistic capabilities, placing US adherence to SALT I in 
jeopardy Finally, the decision to deploy Pershing II and cruise missiles in 
Europe went forward Despite rising European opposition to the deployment, 
especially m NATO s northern tier, and over the protests of domestic critics 
pressing for a freeze on nuclear weapons, the Reagan administration went 
forward on all these fronts, encouraged by continued over-all domestic public 
support for its policies
With the resumption of START talks and growing signs of Soviet 
interest in returning to the nuclear arms control bargaimng table, the 
administration again adjusted its strategic nuclear language to ftt the times 
Allied and domestic pressures to cap US military expenditures and to hold 
the line on nuclear weapons development, partly to exploit renewed Soviet 
interests m cuts, prompted the administration to signal greater interest m 
arms control President Reagan even allowed, at the Reykjavik summit in 
the fall of 1986, that it was desirable m principle, and conceivable in practice, 
to eliminate all ICBMs This concession was never tendered at the Reykjavik 
meeting since it depended on Soviet willingness to accept the US SDI
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program as consistent with SALT I For some allies, like Britain and France, 
eliminating superpower strategic ground-based systems went too far, and the 
administration was prevailed upon to-return to a tougher stance 50 Despite 
these oscillations m the administration s signalling, the INF treaty banning 
all nuclear missiles between 500 and 5000 kilometers was signed, and new 
impetus was given to nuclear and nonnuclear arms talks
US arms control policies also evidence an adaptability on the part of 
the US policy process to incorporate seemingly contradictory strategic 
perspectives and weapons interests into its arms control proposals On one 
hand, the evolution of actual arms control agreements since the 1960s can be 
viewed as a rationalization of US nuclear modernization and as a way to 
manage domestic and allied opposition to operational US nuclear policies 
The Partial Test Ban treaty actually led to an increase m underground nuclear 
testing, partly as the product of Kennedy administration compromises with 
the military services and the JCS to support the treaty 51 SALT II ceilings on 
the development of new offensive weapons were set sufficiently high to 
permit both superpowers to deploy significantly new nuclear systems without 
having to violate SALT II ceilings Indeed, Soviet deployment of SS-18 and 
SS-20 missiles were not in violation of the letter of the treaty, nor were new 
US systems, described above, precluded by SALT II Similarly, the counting 
rules of the emerging START treaty will effectively lead to only a 25-30 
percent cut in US and Soviet warhead totals, not the fifty percent cut that was 
widely publicized earlier 52 Partisans of expanded US nuclear capabilities—in 
Congress, the Executive branch, and among arms producers and interested 
elites both mside and outside the nuclear policy process—have been able to 
use their influence within the arms control process to bargain hard for 
internal arms compromises that have essentially left the MAD-plus posture 
intact
On the other hand, arms control limits have been placed on the 
development of more and better nuclear offensive and defensive capabilities 
In addition, a broad spectrum of opinion, opposed to warfighting policies, has 
been ventilated through the arms control process If the latter pressures 
cannot be said to have decisively limited nuclear acquisitions, they did elicit 
responses and, arguably, functioned as signals defimng the limits to which 
nuclear expansion might go Arms control advocates m the 1960s won the 
fight for a PTB and set m motion a process for increasing limits on civilian 
and military nuclear testing They also succeeded, with Congress as the 
principal battleground, to impede the development of anti-ballistic programs 
and, accordingly, to set the stage for the signing of SALT 153
The Reagan administration also felt impelled to quiet protests to 
Pershing and cruise missile deployments by proposing a so-called zero-option 
if the Soviet Union dismantled its long-range regional systems Despite 
President Reagan's popularity, the administration was also compelled to
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compromise on its MX proposals and to accept, m principle, the development 
of the Midgetman missile, and to conduct arms talks with the Soviet Union 
on terms of a build-down of strategic systems (until negotiations were 
abruptly suspended by Moscow m the wake of US Pershing II deployments in 
Germany) 54 Pressures on the administration, again primarily concentrated m 
Congress, also served notice of nsing legislative and public demands to 
preserve US adherence, informally, to SALT II limits, to engage in INF and 
START talks, to block the development of anti-satellite (ASAT) systems, to 
limit spending on SDI, to apply a narrow interpretation of permissible 
research and development to the SALT I treaty, to slow nuclear testing, and to 
open discussions with the Soviet Union for the creation of risk-reduction 
centers 55
What is interesting to observe is that announced US nuclear policies 
reflect a considerable sensitivity to a broad range of, by no means compatible, 
strategic viewpoints and weapons program interests They signaled shifts in 
the US bargaining stance vis-a-vis the Soviet Union that adapted to changes 
in the perception of the Soviet threat and to allied and domestic demands, 
alternately, for more or fewer nuclear weapons and for a firmer or more 
flexible negotiating stance toward Moscow At the same time, the unexpected 
result, at an operational level, has been a record of remarkable consistency 
since the 1960s m the pursuit, by the United States, of a MAD-plus strategy
It is also important to recognize that if one traces the evolution of US 
nuclear policy since World War n, the battle lines between rival coalitions 
cannot be drawn simply along institutional boundanes, separating the 
Congress and the Executive branch, nor, for that matter, do they consistently 
conform to partisan and party differences While it is certainly true that the 
separation of powers is an invitation to Congress and the President to 
compete for the control of foreign and security policy, it is also evident that 
splits along nuclear policy lines do not conform to those marked by the 
separation of powers Nor can it be argued, as the discussion above suggests, 
that the President or even the military services m the Executive Branch have 
been the most vociferous supporters of expanded nuclear capabilities at all 
times or of an aggressive nuclear doctrinal stance Over time the political 
equilibrium of opposing forces between and within each branch of 
government has favored an operational strategy of MAD-plus The 
equilibrium point for announced nuclear policies has wavered more, tilting 
at times m the direction of warflghtmg at one extreme and, on other 
occasions, toward arms control and disarmament
In the late 1950s and 1970s, for example, Congressional pressures 
mounted on the President to increase US nuclear preparedness In the early 
1970s, the shared congressional-presidential priority for SALT I and SALT n 
and for détente with the Soviet Umon also accommodated interests favoring 
the development of an expanded set of nuclear options for the President
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Within the Executive branch, the so-called Schlesinger doctrine, named after 
Defense Secretary James Schlesinger, called for an array of new nuclear 
capabilities, principally the MX and perfected sea-launched ballistic missiles, 
and ICBMs, to provide the President a choice between all-out nuclear war or 
policy paralysis and inaction in the force of a Soviet challenge to US interests
Meanwhile, Senator Henry Jackson, a Democrat and recognized 
Congressional expert m security policy, also succeeded in attaching a 
reservation to the SALT I treaty advanced by a Republican administration 
The Jackson amendment insisted that any future agreements not limit 
the US to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to the limits 
provided for the Soviet Union 56 This meant that SALT II would have to 
hold both superpowers not only to equivalent levels of launchers but also to 
throw-weight or megatonnage The political fallout from the Jackson 
amendment eventually reached the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency 
(ACDA) where those officials favoring constraints on offensive arms were 
gradually purged from office 57 Earlier, following the rules of coalitional 
politics dictated by the American system, Congress took the lead in creating 
ACDA in the 1950s to reach a quite different aim, viz, to give arms control 
and disarmament a voice within the the Executive branch and to strengthen 
the organizational base of this perspective in the legislative process within 
the Executive branch
If differences over nuclear policy do not fall neatly along institutional 
or party lines, the decentralization and diffusion of power within and across 
the two branches of government and within the party systems of both parties 
afford partisans of different persuasions and with divergent interests with 
respect to nuclear policy to carry on their battles even as they struggle to adapt 
to new external circumstances, particularly to the changing reality (and 
perception of that reality) of the Soviet and, more generally, the Communist 
threat to US security interests The process also ventilates contesting views 
about the political utility of nuclear weapons and the potential dangers that 
nuclear arms races and large inventories pose for stability and safety
Representing Interests in the British and French Systems
Of the three systems under examination, the British system polarizes 
most Party politics and the time-honored debating and questioning 
procedures of Parliament foster sharp differentiation of official positions 
between the parties, rather than blurred compromises across party and 
legislative-executive lines, characteristic of the US system These ideological 
and party differences in Britain also inform the public discussion of nuclear 
policy The deep splits within the British security policy community and the 
public are suggested by the development of a considerable body of British 
opinion committed since the 1950s to unilateralism and to the gradual 
abandonment of an independent British nuclear deterrent or, at least, to
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lower nuclear capabilities than those acquired or projected by the government 
in power These opposing domestic views to official British policies have also 
been associated with downgrading the pnonty assigned to Anglo-American 
relations as against either an independent national course or one committed 
to greater integration into the European community 58
Considerations of national security, of discretion in dealing with 
Washington, and of managing the partisan struggle and public opposition 
have encouraged British prime ministers, in formulating and executing 
governmental nuclear policy, to avail themselves of the broad discretion that 
they enjoy under British governing traditions Quite independently of 
parliamentary or mass party participation, they have been able to define the 
country s nuclear policy often without the knowledge of many cabinet 
officials or Parliament Conventional wisdom which portrays the Prime 
Minister and her cabinet as responsible to the Parliament also has to be 
qualified if the evolution of British nuclear policy is carefully reviewed 59
Whereas France s military nuclear program under the Fourth Republic 
was pursued in spite of the government, Britain s efforts to build a bomb 
were authorized in secret at the highest levels of government by a small 
group of determined men At the close of World War H, Pome Minister 
Clement Atlee and his closest cabinet advisors had few doubts about their 
decision What doubts on strategic or economic grounds raised at the 
meeting, GEN 75, the Prime Minister s special committee to consider the 
bomb decision, were swept aside by Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin We ve 
got to have this [the bomb], I don t want any other Foreign Secretary of this 
country to be talked to or at by a Secretary of State in the Umted States as I 
have just been in my discussions with Mr Byrnes We have got to have this 
thing over here whatever it costs 60 Similarly, the decisions associated with 
the British aim of close nuclear cooperation with the Umted States were 
largely decided in camera and, accordingly, pursued with circumspection to 
minimize adverse partisan and public opposition Neither the cabinet nor 
the voting public, much less the opposition, was consulted about these 
decisions
Whereas French nuclear policy under the Fifth Republic was thrust on 
the French National Assembly and populace at de Gaulle’s insistence, 
successive Labor and Conservative British prune mimsters retreated behind 
doors with only a handful of close advisors and cabinet mimsters to decide 
the most important decision that any government can make, the security of 
the nation While membership on these highly selected prime ministerial 
committees varied somewhat over the years, normally the Secretaries for 
Defense and Foreign Affairs and the Chancellor of the Exchequer were 
consulted Their decisions, however, were still binding on the cabinet as a 
whole, although most members were neither informed about the existence of
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these committees nor of their critical decisions Some committees were so 
secret that even their very existence was never reported
On practical grounds, as Labor Prime Minister Harold Wilson observed 
in explaining his closed-door approach to nuclear decisionmaking, It isn t a 
question of not trusting It s a question that the more people you have, the 
more people can be got at 61 In the short-run, secrecy helped control 
dissidents within the cabinet and party, frustrated foreign adversaries, and 
minimized frictions in allied bargaining In justifying the Trident decision 
taken by the Prime Minister s cabinet committee, former Defense Permanent 
Undersecretary Sir Frank Cooper summarized an attitude shared by Labor and 
Conservative prime ministers The Governments perfectly entitled to take 
decisions in any way it wants 62
British prime mimsters and aspirants to the post assume that once in 
power their policies will be carried out by the ministries although these may 
veer sharply from prevailing practices and override entrenched interests If it 
had won the election, everyone could have fully expected that the new Prime 
Minister, Neil Kinnock, would have implemented the Labor party s 
manifesto to which he was publicly committed Because of the latitude in 
policymaking accorded to a prime minister m this domain, anxieties and 
doubts inevitably arose m Washington policy areles when the Labor party 
embraced a unilateralist position m the elections of 1983 and 1987 In reply to 
a question about whether Whitehall would support a radical shift in Britain s 
nuclear policy if Labor were elected, Kinnock expressed surprise that his 
party's platform would not be implemented by the avilian and military 
ministries
I think you do both the Chiefs of Staff and junior officers 
and semor avil servants and their juniors a disservice in 
believing that they are so prejudiced against the ideas of 
government—an elected government—as to try and frustrate its 
will espeaally m an important area of activity [abandonment of 
Polaris and Tndent] So I don't think they would change the 
habit of a lifetime, which is admired throughout the 
world, for the purpose that you suggest63
No one would dispute that the French President is the major force 
determining French nuclear policy He exercises the final say in resolving 
disputes within the security community over weapons and strategy This 
does not mean that he can escape being pressured or lobbied by speaal 
interests All the services, for example, have been equipped with nuclear 
arms and assigned a role in the state s deterrence strategy This policy can of 
course be explained on grounds of perceived strategic imperatives It also 
submits to the view that, since nuclear weapons are at the center of French 
strategic policy, all of the services had to be placated to some degree by
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permitting them to acquire nuclear weapons as part of the nation s deterrent 
posture The Army s acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons is a case m point 
Their limited range poses as much a threat to the Germans, which they are 
supposed to defend withm the terms of the Atlantic Alliance, as to the 
Warsaw Pact In any event, and m contrast to American practice, special 
pleaders must go through the French President, they have little course 
available to them to go around him
That de Gaulle s successors have essentially accepted his conception of 
the presidential office, particularly with respect to nuclear weapons, is 
suggested by the title of one of the few probing analyses of French foreign- 
policy decisionmaking available today—The Nuclear Monarchy 64 If 
emulation is the highest form of flattery, that compliment was paid to the 
Gaullist notion of presidential and executive dominance over nuclear and 
defense issues by Socialist President François Mitterrand s assumption of the 
full powers of the constitutional office bequeathed to him by de Gaulle, 
although he had voted against the creation of presidential office based on 
popular election and had opposed the force de dissuasion
The French and British have also rejected the idea of establishing a 
separate governmental agency to be concerned with arms control French and 
British strategic policy, emerging from a traditional understanding of 
diplomacy honed by centuries of practice, does not sharply distinguish 
between arms control and nuclear deterrence Both are presumably in 
support of French foreign and security aims In French thinking, it is logical 
that the state would pursue contradictory policies—at once attempting to 
shape foreign actors in favorable ways by threatening them and to 
compromise differences by entering into arms control and disarmament 
arrangements Of course the balance between threats and blandishments is 
endemic to diplomacy among rivals, even m a pre-nudear age, but the 
leadership of neither state believes that this prudential problem of balance 
can be resolved satisfactorily by creating competing organizational entities 
withm the government charged with weighing the scales in their favor In 
both cases, the Ministries of Defense and Foreign Affairs are primarily 
responsible, respectively, for military policy and for developing the nation s 
arms control position vis-a-vis other states 65 In the organizational hierarchy 
of both governments, nuclear policy, viewed primarily as the projection of 
threats or operational use, is ascendant over arms control or disarmament 
considerations
Finally, like the British Parliament, the French National Assembly has 
little leeway in revising governmental plans and defense budget requests 
short of overturning the government Power over defense policy, weapons 
procurement, and military budgets has dearly shifted from the National 
Assembly under the Fourth Republic to the French President and his chosen 
Pnme Mimster under the Fifth Under the Fourth Republic, budgets were
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voted sometimes for only a few months at a time Fifty-four such provisional 
budgets were voted in the last ten years of the Fourth Republic This short­
term and unstable system of policymaking was as much attributable to 
France s continuous state of war and economic upheaval during this period 
as to the instability of party coalitions in parliament The result was, as one 
commentary notes, a patchy and incoherent military policy 66
In the Fifth Republic, the executive tightly controls the National 
Assembly s examination of the five-year law programs and the budgetary 
process with respect to the timing of debates and the information that will be 
supplied to the parliament Hearings by the Committee on National Defense 
and the Armed Forces and the Committee on Finances and the Economy 
provide useful information about the government s defense plans, but these 
inquiries are heavily dependent on governmental cooperation There exist 
few means available to French legislators to evaluate defense programs 
independently of the assessments channeled through official sources These 
committees are also limited by the Constitution in their capacity to amend 
governmental defense bills Only amendments first discussed m committee 
can be considered on the floor, these cannot raise or lower expenditure 
authority, and even if passed, the government can ignore them if it chooses 
since the parliament has no effective way to insist on its will short of 
overturning the government
If the government engages the confidence of the National Assembly, 
legislators are hard pressed to defeat a proposal Censure requires an absolute 
majority of the National Assembly Only the votes of parliamentarians who 
are present are counted so those absent or not voting essentially endorse the 
government s position This procedure was used on two occasions in the 
early de Gaulle years to pass the 1960-64 law-program and to authorize 
supplementary appropriations to cover overruns at the Pierrelatte nuclear 
diffusion plant There has been only one instance since 1958 m which the 
National Assembly has met the censure requirement It rejected the 
President s plan, offered by the Prime Minister to the National Assembly, for 
the direct election of the president In a subsequent referendum on the issue, 
the dissenting majority within the National Assembly lost decisively when 
the proposed amendment to the Constitution earned by a large majonty of 
the voting public A challenge to the President on defense policy is not 
assumed lightly by legislators What expenence they have had with such 
challenges on issues associated with nuclear affairs has not been encouraging 
with respect to the prospects for success or for their continued stay m office
French legislators have apparently adjusted gradually to their loss of 
power and limited influence on defense policy Accompanying this 
adaptation process has been a decline of legislative interest in defense issues 
although individual legislators, like former Defense Ministers Joel le Theule 
and Charles Hemu, developed successful legislative careers by becoming
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defense experts Le Theule explained the disincentives of following such a 
career pattern from his own experience Parliament no longer knows the 
distribution of program authorizations for mam programs, has no means to 
modify the major choices when the budget is voted, and cannot even be 
assured that the execution of the budget will be entirely compatible with what 
was foreseen Having little to do with defense policy and with how its 
objectives are attained, Parliament is losing interest m these problems 
Parliament hardly enters into the definition of this policy 67
Conclusions
Alexis de Tocqueville was among the first to argue that democracies differ 
from other forms of government m foreign and security policies His views 
that popularly based systems were both slow to go to war and, by extension, 
unwilling and ill-equipped to pursue consistent and coherent policies to 
prevent or to prepare for war have been echoed through the years by many 
distinguished observers 68 Insofar as nuclear policies are concerned, it would 
appear that the American, French, and British democracies would belie this 
age-old belief Each of the three systems has sustained nuclear programs 
characterized more by continuity than by rapid changes or even by slow and 
uneven development
Below the surface of often contentious public debates and the pull and 
haul of powerful elites jockeying for different nuclear programs and strategic 
postures particularly notable m the US case, the nuclear programs of the 
Western states have doggedly moved forward They have been aided and 
abetted by powerful political support within the legislative and executive 
branches of these states and by the subsequent inexorable bureaucratization 
and institutionalization of nuclear weapons into their strategic and foreign 
policies The separation of power, pure parliamentanamsm, and a mixed 
presidential-parliamentary system have accomplished what their 
governments sought The exception is the French parliamentary system of 
the Fourth Republic Beset by internal and external pressures beyond its 
capacity directly to contain or control, it was unable to confront the nuclear 
issue Regime change, leading to the Fifth Republic, appears to have been a 
necessary, if not sufficient, explanation for France’s embrace of an 
independent nuclear policy and, eventually, for its withdrawal from NATO, 
the military arm of the Atlantic Alliance
If announced and operational nuclear policies are distinguished, the 
American system has been the most robust of the three Western nuclear 
states m balancing conflicting strategic viewpoints and competing special 
interests concerned with weapons development and acquisition US arms 
control policy illustrates the adaptability of announced policy to changing 
perceptions of the Soviet or Communist threat or, conversely, to domestic
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and allied fears that nuclear arms races may have themselves contributed to 
Cold War tensions and the destabilization of the balance of terror 
Superpower arms control agreements, most notably the Partial Test Ban 
treaty, SALT II, and the emerging START treaty, have rationalized nuclear 
modernization and managed domestic and allied opposition to strengthening 
the warfighting capabilities of the US nuclear arsenal Not paradoxically, 
these accords and the larger policy process out of which they emerged may 
also be viewed as compromises between rival groups, within and outside the 
governmental policy process These internal understandings have set 
implicit and explicit limits to the size and quality of US nuclear arms The 
operational consequence of these compromises has been MAD-plus Nuclear 
policy has proven to be stable, but at the same time those who consider 
nuclear arms and arms races as fundamentally disruptive have been able to 
limit nuclear expansion programs that, arguably, might have otherwise been 
larger They have also created a political base within the policy process from 
which support for arms control negotiations and accords could be mounted
With fewer resources at their disposal and with more circumscribed 
international obligations and responsibilities than those of the United States, 
Britain and France have had more limited nuclear weapons choices available 
to them Under the Fifth Republic, France has more successfully balanced 
policy stability and representation than Britain In focusing nuclear 
policymaking and operational authority in the office of a popularly elected 
President, the Fifth Republic not only fixed the decision about nuclear 
weapons squarely m the presidency but also freed day-to-day political 
demands from the office Coping with urgent and pressing issues is left to a 
prime minister, subject to a qualified vote of confidence of the National 
Assembly The triple combination of indisputable political authority over 
nuclear policy, an independent popular political base, and freedom from the 
daily exigencies of govermng have proven to be key institutional changes 
within the French system They have fostered both policy stability and public 
and elite support for independent nuclear weapons
It cannot be conclusively argued that these constitutional changes 
assured interest harmonization What can be said with more confidence is 
that the Fifth Republic regime, unlike the Fourth, dismantled many of the 
impediments and dissolved many of the partisan incentives working against 
national consensus The Fourth Republic's weak coalitional form of 
government, centered in a prime minister who acted more as a compromiser 
and temporizer than as an arbitrator and leader had, as de Gaulle argued, the 
ironic effect of fostering division and polarization m nuclear and foreign 
policy and, accordingly, of producing indecision and paralysis
Unlike the Fourth Republic, the British system has been decisive at a 
governmental level in pursuing a nuclear weapons policy and close ties with 
the United States It has been less successful, as a system, m promoting the
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accommodation of different and divergent domestic interests, although it 
might well be argued that the divisions within British society over nuclear 
weapons could not be bridged by a separation of powers system or some 
variant of the French Fifth Republic The heightened partisanship of British 
politics, an electoral system favonng a two-party system, the polemic habits of 
cabinet officials, and the incentives of polarizing party positions within 
Parliament and within the public—respectively, for legislative and electoral 
advantage—appear to hinder the British system m accommodating rival 
perspectives and interests compared to US, and even French, practice on 
nuclear issues The greater secrecy surrounding British nuclear policymaking 
than is the case for the US, and to a lesser extent for France, would also appear 
to have contributed to the dissensus on nuclear policy
Collective responsibility has continued to operate in British nuclear 
policy but not collective cabinet knowledge of what it was responsible for If 
the cabinet has been kept in the dark, the opposition and public have even 
less knowledge of what policies the government was actually pursuing or 
when key decisions—for example, Chevaline—were taken Intra-party 
differences over nuclear policy have not been regularly thrashed out m 
cabinet nor have inter-party differences been regularly debated and aired 
within Parliament as they have been within the American and French 
systems Public and partisan debates tend to assume a sharper either-or form 
in the British system than m the American system and within the 
presidential system of the French Fifth Republic
Do institutions count in nuclear policymaking7 The clearest evidence 
for an affirmative response arises from French experience Do they always 
count7 Here the response has to be more shaded and nuanced All three 
systems (the Fourth Republic notwithstanding) have produced stable nuclear 
policies whether one agrees with them or not The American system 
evidences continued public tension and discord, but a consistency m nuclear 
policy behind the scenes The British system alone has posed the issue 
squarely of continuing as a nuclear power in the elections of 1983 and 1987 
The British electoral system has aided continuity Two Labor defeats, not to 
mention the sunk costs of a Tndent program, have gradually modified Labor 
party opposition This moderating process tends to emerge more gradually, 
but surely, within the American system as frictions at the margin are 
addressed and as a rolling, if always uneasy, compromise on specific weapons 
and arms control measures is reached among nval players
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